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School of Public Policy, George Mason University, University Boulevard, Fairfax, Virginia 22030-4444
The usefulness of quantitative decision aid is often impaired and its usage impeded by the misaligned priorities of analysts and the middlemen who employ them. Analysts professional orientation may dispose them to attend to analytic processes more than to deciders needs and to stick with outdated practices. As a result, their analyses may be technically sound but disregard key knowledge, make unrealistic assumptions, or answer the wrong questions. Middlemens financial or other conflicts of interest exacerbate such defects. Deciders may have to take more control of analyses (and analysts) and, for example, bypass middlemen.
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