|
|
||||||||
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
We apply new bilevel and trilevel optimization models to make critical infrastructure more resilient against terrorist attacks. Each model features an intelligent attacker (terrorists) and a defender (us), information transparency, and sequential actions by attacker and defender. We illustrate with examples of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the US Border Patrol at Yuma, Arizona, and an electrical transmission system. We conclude by reporting insights gained from the modeling experience and many "red-team" exercises. Each exercise gathers open-source data on a real-world infrastructure system, develops an appropriate bilevel or trilevel model, and uses these to identify vulnerabilities in the system or to plan an optimal defense.
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
gbrown{at}nps.edu
mcarlyle{at}nps.edu
jsalmero{at}nps.edu
kwood{at}nps.edu
This article has been cited by other articles:
![]() |
G. G. Brown and R. E. Rosenthal Optimization Tradecraft: Hard-Won Insights from Real-World Decision Support Interfaces, September 1, 2008; 38(5): 356 - 366. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
M.G.H Bell, U Kanturska, J.-D Schmocker, and A Fonzone Attacker-defender models and road network vulnerability Phil Trans R Soc A, June 13, 2008; 366(1872): 1893 - 1906. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
D. Jacobson and E. H. Kaplan Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 1, 2007; 51(5): 772 - 792. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
| HOME | HELP | FEEDBACK | SUBSCRIPTIONS | ARCHIVE | SEARCH | TABLE OF CONTENTS |